Abstract-The way data structures organize data is often a function of the sequence of past operations. The organization of data is referred to as the data structure's state, and the sequence of past operations constitutes the data structure's history. A data structure state can, therefore, be used as an oracle to derive information about its history. For history-sensitive applications, such as privacy in e-voting, it is imperative to conceal historical information contained within data structure states. Data structure history can be hidden by making data structures history independent. In this paper, we explore how to achieve history independence (HI). We observe that the current HI notions are significantly limited in number and scope. There are two existing notions of HI: 1) weak HI (WHI) and 2) strong HI (SHI). WHI does not protect against insider adversaries, and SHI mandates canonical representations, resulting in inefficiency. We postulate the need for a broad, encompassing notion of HI, which can capture WHI, SHI, and a broad spectrum of new HI notions. To this end, we introduce HI, a generic game-based framework that is malleable enough to accommodate the existing and new HI notions. As an essential step toward formalizing HI, we explore the concepts of abstract data types, data structures, machine models, memory representations, and HI. Finally, to bridge the gap between theory and practice, we outline a general recipe for building end-to-end, history-independent systems and demonstrate the use of the recipe in designing two historyindependent file systems.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
ATA STRUCTURES are commonly used constructs to store and retrieve data in systems. However, data structures carry more information than the raw data they organize. One aspect of this information is the history leading to the data structure's current state [1] .
Concealing historical information contained within data structure states is necessary for incremental signature schemes [2] and for privacy in voting systems [2] , [3] . Therefore, the need arises for data structures that reveal no information about the history that led to their current state other than what is inherently visible from the data. History independence [4] has been devised to enable the design of such data structures and they are termed as "history independent data structures". We have identified the role of history independence in designing systems that are compliant with data retention regulations [5] . Retention regulations desire that once data is deleted, no evidence about the past existence of deleted data must be recoverable. Such a deletion cannot be achieved by simply overwriting data as in secure deletion [6] . This is because overwriting does not eliminate the effects that previous existence of delete data leaves on the current system state. Even after secure deletion, the current state can be used as an oracle to derive information about the past existence of deleted records. For example, the current organization of data blocks on disk is a function of the sequence of previous writes to file system or to database search indexes. The organization could be different depending on whether a particular record was deleted in the past or was never inserted in the data set.
History independence (HI) is concerned with the historical information preserved within data structure states. The preserved history may be illicitly used by adversaries to violate regulatory compliance. For example, an adversary may breach data retention laws by recovering deleted data. Therefore, to understand history independence, we need to specify what we mean by state, what we mean by history, and what an adversary can do.
State: A data structure's state is an organization of data on a physical medium such as memory or disk.
History: History is the sequence of operations that led to the current data structure state.
Threat: For many existing data structures, the current state is a function of both data and history [1] . Hence, by analyzing the current state an adversary can derive the state's history. Examples of application specific historical information include:
• Evidence of past existence of deleted data [7] .
• Order of votes in a voting application [2] , [3] .
• Intermediate versions of published documents [2] . History Independence: History independence is a characteristic of a data structure. A data structure is said to be history independent if from the adversary's point of view, the current data structure state is a function of data only and not of history. Thus, the current state of a history independent data structure reveals no information to the adversary about its history other than what is inherently visible from the data itself. We emphasize that history independence is concerned with historical information that is revealed from data organization and not from the data.
Types of History Independence: Naor et al. [8] introduced two notions of history independence -weak history independence (WHI) and strong history independence (SHI).
WHI and SHI differ in the number of data structure states an adversary is permitted to observe. Under WHI, an adversary is permitted to observe only the current data structure state.
For example, as in case of a stolen laptop. Under SHI, an adversary is permitted several observations of data structure states throughout a sequence of operations. For example, as in case of an insider adversary who can obtain a periodic memory dump. For SHI, the adversary should be unable to identify which sequence of operations was applied between any two adjacent observations. WHI assumes a weak adversary while SHI is a very powerful notion of history independence, secure even against a computationally unbounded adversary [1] . Currently, applications are restricted to using data structures with either WHI or SHI characteristics. However, applications that do not fit into either WHI or SHI do exist. For example, a journaling system that reveals no historical information other than the last k operations. 1 Further, WHI does not protect against insider adversaries and SHI results in inefficiency [9] . Hence, there is a necessity for new notions of history independence targeted towards specific application scenarios.
In this paper we take the first steps towards better understanding the history independence spectrum and its applicability to systems. The contributions of this paper are:
• The exploration of abstract data types, data structures, machine models, and memory representations • New game-based definitions of weak and strong history independence (Sections III-A and III-B) that are more appropriate for the security community as compared to existing terminology [4] , [8] .
• A new notion of history independence termed history independence ( HI). HI centers around a generic game-based definition of history independence and is malleable enough to accommodate WHI, SHI, and a broad spectrum of new history independence notions (Section V-A). HI also helps to quantify the history revealed or hidden by existing data structures which have been designed without history independence in mind.
• A general recipe for designing history independent systems and the recipe's use in designing a history independent file system (Section IV).
• The design and evaluation of delete agnostic file system (DAFS). In DAFS, we re-design the file system layer to support new history independence notions. DAFS also increases file system resilience via journaling in the presence of history independence.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Formalizing history independence requires an understanding of data structures. A data structure itself can be viewed as an implementation of an abstract data type (ADT) on a machine model [1] . An abstract data type (ADT) is a specification of operations for data organization while a machine model represents a physical computing machine.
In the following, we provide an overview of ADTs, data structures, machine models, and memory representations as proposed in [1] that are relevant to history independence. Then, in Section III we formalize history independence. 1 We give additional examples in Section V-A.
A. Abstract Data Type (ADT)
The specification of data organization techniques is often done via abstract data types. The key characteristic of an ADT is that it specifies operations independently of any specific implementation. We use the concept proposed by Golovin [1] 
ADT as a Graph: We can imagine the ADT to be a directed graph G, where each vertex represents an ADT state and each edge is labeled with an ADT operation along with an ADT input and an ADT output. The label for an edge between two vertices represents the operation that causes the transition between the corresponding states. We call the graph G, the state transition graph of the ADT.
We use the concept of viewing the ADT as a graph for a better understanding of HI in Section II-D.
B. Models of Execution
An ADT is only a specification of operations for organizing data. For more practical use, such as for efficiency analysis, concrete implementations of the ADT operations are required. ADT implementations are provided via programs that can be executed on a given machine model. An ADT's implementation in a given machine model is a data structure.
RAM Model of Execution:
The RAM model of execution models a traditional serial computer. The model consists of two components, a central processing unit (CPU) and a random access memory (RAM). Both the CPU and RAM are finite state machines (FSM) [10] .
The RAM consists of m = 2 u storage locations. Each location is a b-bit word and has a unique log 2 m bit address associated with it. 3 Two operations are permitted on a storage location in the RAM. First, a load operation to access the b-bit bit word stored at the location. Second, a store operation that copies a given b-bit word to the location. Typically, the b-bit words are copied to or copied from CPU registers.
The CPU consists of n b-bit registers and operates on a fetch-and-execute cycle [10] . The CPU has an associated set of instructions that it can perform. CPU instructions are specified in a programming language. A program in a RAM model is a finite sequence of programming language instructions.
A machine model can itself be considered as an ADT [1] . In this case, the set of ADT states is the set of all machine states, and the set of ADT operations is the set of all machine programs. For the RAM model, the set of ADT states, the set of inputs, and the set of outputs are all bit strings. 
C. Data Structure
An implementation for an ADT in a given machine model is obtained as follows.
• A machine representation is chosen for each ADT input and output.
• For each ADT operation a machine program is selected that provides the functionality of the ADT operation.
• A unique machine state is selected to represent the initial ADT state.
⊆ . α is a mapping from ADT inputs to machine inputs. That is, for any ADT input i , α(i ) is the machine representation of the input. Similarly, β is the mapping from ADT outputs to machine outputs. γ is the mapping from ADT operations to machine programs. For an ADT operation o, γ (o) is the machine program implementing o. Finally, just as the ADT A is initialized to a unique state s φ , a unique machine state s M 0 is selected to represent the initial data structure state. Data Structure State: A data structure state is a machine state. The set of all data structure states consists of all machine states that are reachable from the initial data structure state by executing machine programs for the ADT operations.
State Transition Graph for Data Structure: A data structure can be considered to be a directed graph G, where each vertex represents a data structure state and each edge is labeled with a machine program implementing an ADT operation along with a machine input and a machine output. The label for an edge between two vertices represents the program that causes the transition between the corresponding states. We call the graph G, the state transition graph of the data structure.
D. A Semi-Formal Look At HI
The Non-Isomorphism Problem: In Section I we introduced the two existing history independence notions -weak history independence (WHI) and strong history independence (SHI). 4 4 Both WHI and SHI are formalized in Section III. Non-isomorphism between the state transition graph of an ADT and of its data structure implementation breaks SHI. WHI on the other hand can be achieved even when the ADT and data structure state transition graphs are non-isomorphic. We look at how non-isomorphism breaks SHI and discuss WHI in the presence of non-isomorphism.
Why Non-Isomorphism Breaks SHI? Non-isomorphism and thus the need for SHI arises when an ADT state has multiple memory representations. 5 We will precisely define memory representations for ADT states in Section II-E. For now, it suffices to say the following: A memory representation for an ADT state that is reachable from the initial ADT state via a sequence of ADT operations is the machine state reachable from the initial data structure state via the corresponding program sequence. For example, in Figure 1 , the data structure states 3, 1, 6 and 6, 1, 3 are memory representations of the ADT state {1, 3, 6}.
To illustrate how non-isomorphism breaks SHI, consider the example graphs from Figure 1 , example paths from Table I , and an adversary with access to the initial ADT state s φ , the initial data structure state s M φ , the current ADT state {1, 3, 6}, and the current data structure state which is either 3, 1, 6 or 6, 1, 3 .
By looking at the ADT states alone, the adversary cannot determine which sequence of ADT operations was used to arrive at the current ADT state {1, 3, 6}. This is because there are two paths p A and p A between the ADT states s φ and {1, 3, 6}. Moreover, the ADT states carry no information about the exact path used to transition from s φ to {1, 3, 6}. Hence, the data alone gives the adversary no advantage in guessing which sequence of ADT operations was applied in the past. Now, by looking at the current data structure state, the adversary can clearly identify which sequence of machine programs was used to arrive at the current data structure state. The current data structure state is either 3, 1, 6 or 6, 1, 3 . There is a unique path from initial data structure state s M φ to each of the states 3, 1, 6 and 6, 1, 3 . Hence, by observing the current data structure state, the adversary can identity whether path p D or path p D was used to transition from state s M φ to the current data structure state. Identification of the path in the data structure state transition graph informs the adversary of the program sequence used. Knowledge of the program sequence used in-turn tells the adversary the 
(i)/t denotes that ADT operation o takes input i and produces output t. Similarly, γ (o)(α(i))/β(t) denotes that program γ (o) takes input α(i) and produces output β(t). α(i) and β(t)
are the machine representations of the ADT input i and ADT output t, respectively. Note that the vertices in figure (b) represent data structure states. In the RAM model these will be bit strings. However, to convey data semantics we denote the hash table array as a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , where a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 are elements at buckets 0, 1 and 2, respectively. Underscore denotes an empty bucket. Highlighted paths are referenced in Table I , and in Section II-D.
sequence of ADT operations used. In conclusion, the data structure implementation gives the adversary an advantage in guessing the history of past execution, thereby breaking history independence.
How Can We Achieve History Independence? The two known ways to make data history independent: Figure 1 . Both data structure states 3, 1, 6 and 6, 1, 3 are valid memory representations of the ADT state {1, 3, 6}. For WHI, the choice between data structure states 3, 1, 6 and 6, 1, 3 to represent the ADT state {1, 3, 6} must be random. As shown in Figure 2 , randomization translates to addition of new paths in the data structure state transition graph to ensure the following: For any two ADT states s 0 and s 1 , if there is a path in the ADT state transition graph between s 0 and s 1 , then, there must be a path from all memory representations of ADT state s 0 to all memory representations of ADT state s 1 in the data structure's state transition graph. The choice of path in the data structure state transition graph between representations of ADT states s 0 and s 1 is then made at random.
From the adversary's point of view randomization makes all memory representations of an ADT state equally likely to occur. Hence, observation of a specific representation gives the adversary no advantage in guessing the sequence of machine programs that led to the current data structure state. Since the adversary Fig. 2 . Using randomization to achieve history independence. The dotted lines indicate new transitions added to the hash table data structure state transition graph. Amongst all edges with the same starting node and the same label, the choice of edge for state transition is made at random. cannot identify the sequence of machine programs used, the adversary is also unable to identify the sequence of ADT operations that led to the current ADT state.
E. Memory Representations
. . , o n be a sequence of ADT operations and I = i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n be a sequence of ADT inputs. We denote by O(δ, s 0 , I ) the application of the ADT operation sequence δ on ADT state s 0 .
If δ is empty no state transition occurs and no outputs are produced. For nonempty sequence δ, s n and τ n denote the ADT state and the ADT output, respectively, produced by the final operation in sequence δ.
To summarize, we denote by O(δ, s 0 , I ) → (s n , τ n ) that the ADT operation sequence δ when applied to the ADT state s 0 with ADT input sequence I , results in the ADT state s n and ADT output τ n . Now, let
Here, α(i ) and β(τ ) denote the machine representations for an ADT input i and an ADT output τ , respectively. s M n and β(τ n ) are the machine state and the machine output, respectively, produced by the final program in sequence δ M . In summary, we denote by 
Here m is the mapping m : S → 2 S D , where S is the set of all ADT states, S D is the set of all data structure states, and 2 S D denotes the power set of S D .
III. HISTORY INDEPENDENCE A. Weak History Independence (WHI)
WHI was introduced for scenarios wherein an adversary observes only the current data structure state. For example, as in the case of a stolen laptop.
Informally, a data structure is said to be weakly history independent if for any two sequences of ADT operations δ 1 and δ 2 , that take the ADT from initialization to a state s, observation of any memory representation of state s gives the adversary no advantage in guessing whether sequence δ 1 or δ 2 was used to get to s.
We define weak history independence (WHI) by the following game: 
D is said to be weakly history independent if the advantage of the adversary for winning the game, defined as |Pr[c = c] − 1/2| is negligible (where "negligible" is defined over any implementation-specific security parameters of the programs in P M ). 6 Since WHI permits the adversary to make a single observation, the adversary is allowed to choose the end state only in step 1. The starting state for the chosen ADT operation sequences is always the initial ADT state s φ . Recall from the data structure definition (Section II-C) that the initial ADT state has a fixed memory representation, which is the initial data structure state s M 0 . Hence, in step 3, the challenger applies the adversary-selected sequence to the memory representation s M 0 of s φ . If the adversary is able to identify the ADT operation sequence chosen by the challenger in step 3, then the adversary wins the game. Winning the game implies the adversary was able to determine the operation sequence that led to the current ADT state by observing the state's memory representation, thereby breaking WHI.
B. Strong History Independence (SHI)
Unlike WHI, SHI is applicable when an adversary can observe multiple memory representations throughout a sequence of operations. For example, as in case of an insider who can obtain a periodic memory dump. SHI requires that the adversary must not gain any additional information about the sequence of operations between any two adjacent observations than what is inherently available from the corresponding ADT states.
Informally, a data structure is said to be strongly history independent if for any two sequences of ADT operations δ 1 2 give the adversary no advantage in guessing whether sequence δ 1 or δ 2 was used to go from s 1 to s 2 .
We define strong history independence (SHI) by the following game: 3) The challenger flips a fair coin c ∈ {0, 1} and computes D is said to be strongly history independent if the advantage of the adversary for winning the game, defined as |Pr[c = c] − 1/2| is negligible (where "negligible" is defined over any implementation-specific security parameters of the programs in P M ).
Winning the game means that the adversary was able to determine the operation sequence that took the ADT from state s 1 to state s 2 , thereby breaking SHI.
SHI implies WHI. If the ADT state s 1 chosen by the adversary in step 1 is the initial ADT state s φ , then the SHI game reduces to the WHI game of Section III-A.
C. Equivalence to Existing Definitions
WHI and SHI were first introduced by Naor and Teague [8] . Later, Hartline [4] introduced new definitions for WHI and SHI. However, Hartline showed that their definitions although less complex are equivalent to the ones proposed by Naor Our game-based definitions of WHI and SHI (Sections III-A and III-B) differ slightly from the definitions by Hartline Specifically, Hartline assume a computationally unbounded adversary. We address history independence in the presence of computationally bounded adversaries to be more in-line with reality. Further, new definitions were necessary to overcome impreciseness in existing definitions and to develop a framework for new history independence notions beyond WHI and SHI. We formally prove equivalence between our game-based definitions of WHI and SHI and the definitions proposed by Hartline in our full online paper [11] .
D. Canonical Representations
Canonically (or uniquely) represented data structures have the property that each ADT state has a unique memory representation. Unique representation implies that the ADT and data structure state transition graphs are isomorphic. 7 Canonically represented data structures give very strong guarantees for history independence and in many cases are the only way to achieve history independence. We formally define canonically represented data structures as follows.
Definition 5 (Canonically Represented Data Structure): A data structure D implementing an ADT A on a machine model M is canonically represented if each ADT state has a unique memory representation. That is, the mapping m : S → 2 S D is injective and |m(s)| = 1, where S is the set of all ADT states, S D is the set of all data structure states, and m(s) denotes the set of memory representations of an ADT state s ∈ S as per definition 4.
In our full online paper [11] , we discuss canonically represented data structures and their applications to history independence in detail. Here, for completeness we mention two theorems that we have proved in our full paper [11] .
Theorem 1: Canonically represented data structure implementations for ADTs with infinite states are impossible in practice.
Theorem 2: A data structure is strongly history independent iff it is canonically represented.
Note that Canonical representations are not necessary for WHI. We refer the reader to our full paper [11] for details.
IV. PRACTICAL SHI FOR FILE SYSTEMS
We now apply our theoretical concepts and results towards practical history independent system designs.
Our focus is designing systems with end-to-end history independent characteristics. The difference between history independent implementations for simple ADTs, such as stacks and queues [1] versus a complete system, such as a database, or a file system is a matter of often exponentially increasing complexity. Fundamentally, any system can be modeled as an ADT and a history independent implementation can be sought for the system.
We introduce a general recipe for building history independent systems as follows:
1) Model the system as an ADT.
2) Select a machine model for implementation. While defining the machine state identify all machine components that the adversary has access to and define the machine state associated with these components. 7 Isomorphism is discussed in Section II-D.
3) Depending on the application scenario, fix a desired notion of history independence. 4) Based on the selected notion of history independence, provide an implementation over the selected machine model. For complex systems, the implementation will likely require the most effort since the machine programs implementing the ADT operations must provably ensure that the advantage of the adversary is negligible in the HI game for that notion of history independence. Using this recipe, we have designed, implemented, and evaluated a history independent file system (HIFS) implementing SHI. We refer the reader to [11] and [12] for the details of HIFS.
V. GENERALIZING HISTORY INDEPENDENCE
SHI is a very strong notion of history independence requiring canonical representations [1] , [4] . Canonically represented data structures are not efficient [9] . For heap and queue data structures Buchbinder and Petrank [9] show that certain operations that require logarithmic time under WHI take linear time under SHI. Hence, it is worth to question the need for canonical representations for history independence. Many scenarios may not require such a strong notion rendering SHI data structures with canonical representations inefficient.
Some scenarios that can be efficiently realized by new history independence notions:
• Hiding evidence of specific operations only. For example, hiding only the fact that a specific data item has been deleted in the past, as required by regulations [5] .
• A most recently used (MRU) cache or a journaling system by definition reveals the last k operations. Hence, journaling and caching require a new notion of history independence, wherein no history is revealed other than the last k operations [8] .
• Revealing only the number of times each operation is performed [1] . For example, in a file-sharing application disclosing file-access counts may be permissible, but not the access order. A straight-forward way to define new notions of history independence is to provide a new game-based definition for each scenario. However, defining distinct scenario-specific games can quickly become a tedious process. Instead, we introduce a definitional framework that can accommodate a broad spectrum of history independence notions. We term the new framework as history independence ( HI), where is the parameter determining the history independence flavor. As we shall see, HI also captures both WHI and SHI. In addition, HI helps to reason about the history revealed or concealed by existing data structures which were designed without history independence in mind.
A.
History Independence ( HI) The WHI and SHI games (Sections III-A and III-B respectively) are defined over a subset of ADT operation sequences. For WHI, the adversary is permitted to select sequences that take the ADT from initialization to the same end state. For SHI, the permitted sequences are ones that take the ADT from the same starting state to the same ending state.
The selection is made by the adversary in step 1 of both the WHI and SHI games. Hence, the initial selection permitted to the adversary determines the history that is desired to be revealed or hidden. By generalizing the selection step, we can accommodate a broad spectrum of history independence notions. We achieve the generalization in HI, defined by the following game:
be a bounded RAM machine model, and D = (α, β, γ, s M 0 ) be a data structure implementing A in M, as per definitions 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Also, let ζ be the set of all ADT operation sequences, ϒ be the set of all ADT input sequences, and be a function :
A probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary selects the following.
• Two ADT states s 1 and s 2 ; two sequences of ADT operations δ 0 and δ 1 ; and two sequences of ADT inputs I 0 and I 1 ; such that
2) The adversary sends s 1 , s M 1 , δ 0 , δ 1 , I 0 and I 1 to the challenger.
3) The challenger flips a fair coin c ∈ {0, 1} and D is said to be history independent if the advantage of the adversary for winning the game, defined as |Pr[c = c] − 1/2| is negligible (where "negligible" is defined over any implementation-specific security parameters of the programs in P M ).
Function
determines the pairs of ADT states, ADT operation sequences, and ADT input sequences that the adversary is permitted to select in step 1 of the HI game. For the adversary-selected ADT states, operation sequences, and input sequences, the HI game can be played and the data structure implementation is required to ensure that the advantage of the adversary is negligible. For a given ADT, defines two sets,
and
For all tuples in H , history independence is preserved, that is, neither the ADT nor the data structure implementation reveals the operation sequence selected by the challenger in step 3. For all tuples in H , history independence is not required to be preserved since the ADT itself reveals the sequence of operations used. A careful choice of allows us to precisely define both SHI and WHI, and a broad spectrum of new history independence notions. In the following, we illustrate the use of HI framework to define some familiar history independence notions and operation agnostic history independence (OAHI), previously unconsidered notions of HI. We refer the reader to our full online paper [11] for further examples of previously unconsidered notions of HI, defined using history independence.
1) Strong History Independence (SHI):
We discussed SHI in Section III-B. Here, we define the function for SHI.
For SHI, the adversary's advantage in the HI game must be negligible when in step 1, the adversary selects any two ADT operation sequences that take the ADT from a state s 1 to a state s 2 producing the same ADT output τ .
2) Weak History Independence (WHI):
Refer to Section III-B for discussion on WHI, which requires the following definition of .
Since WHI permits the adversary to observe a single data structure state, the adversary chooses only the end state s 2 in step 1 of the HI game. The starting state on which sequences δ 0 and δ 1 are applied is the initial ADT state s φ .
3) Operation-Agnostic History Independence (OAHI): Consider a secure deletion application that wishes to destroy any evidence of a delete operation performed in the past. That is, an adversary (by observing the memory representations) should be unable to detect whether a delete operation was performed or not other than guessing. In general, any particular operation may require to be concealed, not just deletes. can be extended to any ADT operation (not just delete). We introduce a new notion of history independence that conceals specific ADT operations. The new notion is referred to as operationagnostic history independence (OAHI). A data structure that is history independent given the following function guarantees operation-agnostic history independence for an ADT operation o. An example of OAHI is delete agnostic history independence (DAHI) (described in detail in Section VI-A) which specifically conceals delete operations.
VI. DELETE AGNOSTIC FILE SYSTEM (DAFS): JOURNALING AND DAHI
The HIFS implementation [12] supports SHI but for higher file system load factors, write efficiency is low. This is because SHI strictly requires canonical representations. To ensure canonical representations, HIFS relocates data on each write operation. The amount of data re-located increases exponentially with the file system load factor. Hence, the write throughputs are significantly lower for load factors over 60%.
Applications that do not require SHI can be made highly efficient using new targeted history independence notions. In Section V-A, using HI we have defined several new history independence notions that unlike SHI, do not require canonical representations. We have re-designed the file system layer to support such new notions. Further, we have extended both functionality and resilience of the file system. The new file system is called Delete Agnostic File System (DAFS).
Journaled History Independence (JHI): In the event of a system failure, it is imperative that the file system state is not corrupted. To ensure this, file systems typically employ a journal. File system operations are first recorded in the journal and then applied to the file storage area. If a failure occurs while writing to the journal, the operations can be ignored on system recovery. On the other hand, if failure occurs while writing to file storage, then on recovery the operations can be re-played from the journal. Thus each write request to the file system causes two disk writes, one to the journal and one to file storage.
DAFS Journaling: In DAFS, a separate region on disk is reserved for a journal in the form of a circular log. The journal contains information for a finite number of file system operations, say k operations. Operations are recorded in the journal in the order in which they are received by the file system. To restore consistency after system failure, it is essential to maintain operation order. Hence, the sequence of k operations recorded in the journal cannot be hidden. The file storage areas, such as the inode tables, disk bucket maps, and the disk buckets provide SHI just as in the case of HIFS. Once a file system operation is applied to file storage and removed from the journal, its timing can no longer be identified.
A. Delete-Agnostic HI (DAHI)
Regulations [5] that are specifically concerned with irrecoverable data erasure and not with other artifacts of history can be met by systems that support OAHI for the delete operation. We refer to this notion of history of independence as delete-agnostic history independence (DAHI). As discussed in Section V-A3, unlike SHI, OAHI for deletes can be achieved without canonical representations. Relaxing the requirement presents significant efficiency benefits.
To make DAFS preserve DAHI only, we first transform the SHI hash table [3] into an DAHI hash table. Then, we use the DAHI hash table to organize files' data and files' metadata.
1) DAHI Hash Table:
The SHI hash table from [3] can be transformed into an DAHI hash table as follows:
The hash table insert operation is modified to not maintain canonical representations. Instead, the insert operation uses linear probing [13] and inserts a key in the first available bucket. The SHI hash table delete operation 8 alone provides DAHI. Deletion of a key from the hash table leaves an empty bucket, say bucket b 1 . The delete operation then finds a key (using the gale-shapely stable marriage algorithm) that prefers bucket b 1 more than the bucket it is currently located in, say bucket b 2 . If such a key is found it is moved from b 2 to b 1 making b 2 empty. The process is then repeated for bucket b 2 , and so on, until no key is found for relocation. The net effect of this process is that a sequence of hash Consider the elements inserted into the hash table by the operations in δ 0 upto the m th operation. We can divide these elements into three sets as follows
Further, ∀y ∈ B, y cannot be mapped to position k in the hash table using linear probing.
∀y ∈ C, y can be mapped to position k in the hash table using linear probing. The three sets are constructed in a way such that the elements of the sets are sorted on the order in which the elements are inserted into the hash table. To illustrate, consider a set S ∈ {A, B, C} and two elements a, b ∈ S such that S i = a and S j = b where S k is the k th element of set S. Also consider δ 0 [ p] = I (a) and δ 0 [q] = I (b). Then, the sorted property of the sets implies that i < j only if p < q.
When the delete operation for x is executed in δ 0 , the elements of A and B are not affected due to the design of the hash table. Further by construction, once x is deleted, the first element from C is placed at position k and all other elements 8 For complete listing of SHI hash table operations refer to [12] . already placed in the hash table are remapped (if necessary). If C = φ, then nothing is written to k after the delete. Let C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , } without loss of generality. Also let D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , } be the elements inserted into the hash table after x was inserted. Once the delete operation is executed in δ 0 , c 1 will be placed at position k and the elements in D will be remapped to positions in the hash table as if x was never inserted. Since, δ 0 does not contain any other delete operations, the resulting state after applying the sequence of operations on the delete-agnostic hash table is equivalent to the resulting state when an insert-only sequence is applied which does not insert and subsequently delete x from the hash table. Note that the definition of the function for operation agnostic history independence for deletes enforces the adversary to select δ 1 to be exactly such a sequence in step 1 of the game. Hence, applying δ 1 to the delete agnostic hash table will lead to the same modifications to the hash table as δ 0 . This ensures indistinguishability between the two sequences of operations for the adversary and gaurantees that the adversary wins the game with only negligible advantage.
2) DAHI in DAFS: DAFS uses the DAHI hash table for file storage. The DAHI hash table insert operation is not required to maintain canonical representations. Since the hash table insert operation is used by file system write operation, the overhead of maintaining canonical representations on file writes is eliminated.
When a file is deleted in DAFS, for each disk bucket allocated to the file, the same effect is achieved as that for a key deleted from the DAHI hash table. As a result, no evidence of a delete remains in the file system state and DAHI is preserved.
Changing the history independence notion from SHI in HIFS to DAHI in DAFS has significant potential for efficiency. The number of writes to disk buckets needed for DAHI is significantly lower as compared to the number of writes needed for SHI. This is because write operations are no longer required to maintain canonical representations. As a result, when disk buckets are allocated to a file, other files' data needs no relocation. The relocation of data was precisely the reason for lower throughputs of HIFS writes.
B. Experiments
DAFS implements two new history independence notions, JHI and DAHI. Both JHI and DAHI are aimed to increase file system efficiency. DAFS can be configured to use DAHI and JHI, either exclusively or together. If DAFS is configured for both JHI and DAHI, then DAFS uses DAFS journaling (Section VI). In this case, if the journal contains an entry for a delete operation then the adversary can learn about this delete from the journal. Thus, DAFS allows the user to configure the filesystem for better performance at the cost of revealing a few deletes to the adversary. All experiments were conducted on servers with 2 Intel Xeon Quad-core CPUs at 3.16GHz, 8GB RAM, and kernel v3.13.0-24. Hitachi HDS72302 SCSI drives were used for storage.
DAFS is implemented as a C++ based user-space Fuse file system. All data structures, including DAHI hash table were written from scratch. We tested DAFS on a file system of size 10 GB and mean database size 1 GB. The experiments were Fig. 3 . TPCC throughputs for Ext3, HIFS, and DAFS with file system load factor. Load factor = space utilization.
conducted on databases with load L.10 (L is the load factor). We used 4 KB disk blocks with 4 block groups and 512 disk blocks per bucket. The typical inode size used was 281 bytes.
To experiment for a real-world scenario we use the TPCC [14] database benchmark. The database of choice is Sqlite. Sqlite data files are stored using HIFS, DAFS (without journaling), and Ext3. The BenchmarkSQL tool is used to generate the TPCC workload.
Each test run commences with an empty file system and creates new databases on file system storage. The number of databases is increased until the file system is 90% full. The TPCC scale factor is 10 giving a size of 1GB for each database. Throughputs are measured at specific load factors. ranging from 10% to 90%. Figure 3 reports the throughputs for HIFS, DAFS, and Ext3. As per the TPCC specification, throughputs are reported as new order transactions executed per minute (tpmc). As seen, the performance of DAFS is up to 4× times better than HIFS for load factors > 50%. Note that the performance of Ext3 is included as a reference. Ext3 does not provide DAHI.
For load factors ≤ 50%, HIFS and DAFS exhibit similar performance. At lower load factors fewer collisions occur as new files are added to file system storage. Fewer collisions mean that the frequency of data relocation to maintain canonical representations is low at load factors ≤ 50%. Hence, performance of DAFS and HIFS is similar at low load factors.
VII. RELATED WORK We refer the reader to our full online paper [11] for a detailed summary of related work and comparisons.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we took a deep look into history independence from both a theoretical and a systems perspective. We explored the concepts of abstract data types, machine models, data structures and memory representations. We identified the need for history independence from the perspective of ADT and data structure state transition graphs. Then, we introduced history independence, which serves as a general framework to define a broad spectrum of history independence notions including strong and weak history independence. We also outlined a general recipe for building history independent systems and illustrated its use in designing two HI file systems.
